in to meet with the chiefs in the large front room upstairs,
and would often monopolize the discussion, the Four playing the part of
listeners merely. Formality was dispensed with. During a debate upon the
southern boundary of Austria, President Wilson might have been seen on
all fours, kneeling on the floor and tracing out the suggested frontier
on a huge map, while other peace commissioners and experts surrounded
him, also on their hands and knees. Hours of labor were long. There was,
certainly, much discussion that hinged upon selfish nationalist
interests, but also much that was inspired by a sincere desire to secure
the solution that would permanently restore the tranquillity of Europe.

The presence of President Wilson did much to maintain the idealism that
jostled national self-seeking in the final drafting of the treaties.
Though he lacked the political brilliance of Lloyd George and had not the
suppressed but irresistible vehemence that characterized Clemenceau, his
very simplicity of argument availed much. He was not destined to carry
through the full programme of idealism as set out in the Fourteen Points,
at least not as interpreted by most liberals. He could not secure the
peace of reconciliation which he had planned, but even with his
popularity in France, Belgium, and Italy lost, and his prestige dimmed,
he retained such a strong position in the Council of Four that he was
able to block some of the more extreme propositions advanced by
imperialist elements, and, more positively, to secure what he had most at
heart, the League of Nations. Whether he yielded more than he gained is a
question which demands more detailed consideration.

CHAPTER XI

BALANCE OF POWER OR LEAGUE OF NATIONS?

Whatever mistakes President Wilson made at Paris, he did not greatly
underestimate the difficulties of his task when he set forth from the
United States. The liberal utterances of the Allied chiefs during the war
had never succeeded in winning his sincere confidence; more than once he
had even intimated that he did not consider their governments completely
representative of public opinion. He anticipated a struggle with
Clemenceau and Lloyd George over the amount of indemnity which was to be
demanded from Germany, as well as over the territory of which she was to
be deprived. Their formal approval of the Fourteen Points had been a cause
of intense satisfaction to him, but he realized definitely that they would
make