had been made in Germany before Russia imported them;
and when they formed the text of presidential addresses, many Germans,
despite themselves, doubtless felt a twinge of sympathy. Coupled with
these appeals went the President's warnings that if they persisted in
tying up their fortunes with those of their rulers, they must share the
penalties. If Germany insisted upon making force alone the deciding
element, then he must accept the challenge and abide the issue. "There
is, therefore, but one response possible from us: Force, Force to the
utmost, Force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant Force
which shall make Right the law of the world and cast every selfish
dominion down in the dust." Neither the appeals nor the warnings of
Wilson had any effect apparent at the moment, and yet the seed was sown.
During the victorious German drives of March, April, and May, opinion to
the east of the Rhine seemed to have rallied firmly behind the Teuton
Government; but with the first slight setbacks of the following month the
process of crumbling began. An American economist and banker, Henry C.
Emery, then prisoner in Germany, tells of the pessimism prevalent as
early as June and the whispers of the approaching fall of the Kaiser. In
his memoirs Ludendorff lays the failure of the German armies in August to
the complete breakdown of the national spirit.

The end came with extraordinary speed. Already in September, after the
defection of Bulgaria and the startling success of Foch's converging
movement on Sedan, Germany knew that she was defeated. The Berlin
Government turned to Wilson and on the 5th of October requested an
armistice. At the same time Austria-Hungary made a similar request
offering to negotiate on the basis of the Fourteen Points. Wilson's
position was delicate. He knew in September that the end was near and
prepared for the situation in some degree by sending Colonel House abroad
to be ready to discuss armistice terms with the Allies. But the sudden
character of the German collapse had intoxicated public opinion to such
an extent that the political idealism which he had voiced ran the risk of
becoming swamped. If Germany were indeed helpless and the Allies
triumphant, there was the danger that, in the flush of victory, all the
promises of a just peace would be forgotten. He must provide against such
a contingency. On the other hand he must secure guarantees that Germany
had indeed thrown off her milita