the same order, or one
and the same chain of causes--that is, the same things following
in either case.
I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the
idea of a circle,--in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a
circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the
actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a
proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again
through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we
consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order
of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the
attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider things
as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of
nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in
the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as they
are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he
consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present
explain my meaning more clearly.
PROP. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do
not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in
the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes
are contained in the attributes of God.
Proof.--This proposition is evident from the last; it is
understood more clearly from the preceding note.
Corollary.--Hence, so long as particular things do not exist,
except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of
God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist,
except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when
particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they
are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they
are said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence,
through which they are said to continue.
Note.--If anyone desires an example to throw more light on
this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,
which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,
inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to
illustrate it as far as possible. The nature of a circle is such
that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the
rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another;
thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle. Yet
none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far
as the circle exists; nor can the idea of an
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