t the army of 4,000 men under Schuyler, that
Clinton would be able to give him any assistance which he might require,
that his own expedition to Philadelphia would divert the enemy from
Burgoyne, that he would be able to "account for" Washington, and that if
Washington gave him the slip, he would be able to follow him up and
prevent him from annoying Burgoyne.[130] These considerations may be
supposed to have satisfied him that no direct co-operation with
Burgoyne was required of him. Burgoyne had to encounter foes whom
neither he nor Howe reckoned upon, and it was Howe's duty to be at hand
to prevent their crushing him. Burgoyne made some mistakes in preparing
for and prosecuting his campaign, but he and his men exhibited splendid
courage, and he is not to be blamed for trying his fortune to the
utmost. In view of his orders, and of the risk of leaving a co-operating
force unsupported, he was bound to ascertain whether he could force his
way through the enemy. The irregular character of the American force
rendered success possible, and justified his gallant attempt of October
7. He was a fine soldier, and was regarded with confidence and affection
by his subordinates. Clinton seems to have done all that was in his
power considering the small force left with him in New York.[131]

[Sidenote: _EFFECT OF THE SURRENDER._]

The surrender of Burgoyne's army could not in itself affect the issue of
the war. Its importance lies in its effect on the policy of foreign
nations and specially of France. So far as the Americans alone were
concerned, England had good reason to expect ultimate success. They
would neither enlist in sufficient numbers to keep up a regular army nor
provide for such troops as they had. The meddlesomeness and incapacity
of congress were destroying its army; generals were intriguing against
one another, soldiers were perishing for lack of necessaries, stores
were wasted. Money was scarce and public credit bad. Early in 1778
congress had 5,500,000 paper dollars in circulation, and the value of
its paper dollar was from half to a quarter of the silver dollar. Above
all, the Americans had no fleet, and were consequently unable to protect
their sea-board. Their alliance with France and subsequently with Spain
brought them, along with other help, the sea-power without which the
issue of the struggle might well have been adverse to them. France and
Spain hoped to recoup themselves for former losses, France by conq