passage of our ships. He could do
no more, for he was forced to send 4,000 men to Howe and could not leave
New York without a sufficient garrison. A messenger from Burgoyne at
last reached him. The way being cleared, the ships ascended the river
and burnt the batteries and town at Esopus creek. The news of Clinton's
activity doubtless secured Burgoyne more favourable terms than Gates was
at first inclined to grant.

The chief blame for this disaster must rest on Howe. His assertion that
Philadelphia was the prime object of his campaign made Germain uneasy,
and he wrote to him on May 18 that whatever he might meditate, he was
not to neglect to co-operate with the northern army.[127] This despatch
did not reach Howe until August 16, when he had made co-operation with
Burgoyne impossible. A few days later Germain wrote again; the despatch
was not ready for his signature at the time at which he wished to go
into the country, and when he came back it was forgotten. It was a piece
of gross carelessness, but an undue importance has been attached to
it.[128] Howe was well aware of Burgoyne's expedition. On June 5 he had
received a copy of a despatch from Germain which told him that Burgoyne
was ordered to "force his way to Albany" and join him with the utmost
speed.[129] Nevertheless, he persisted in pursuing his own plan. He must
have hesitated whether to reach Philadelphia by land or water. When in
June he at last made up his mind to move, he evidently tried to reach
Philadelphia by land. If he had succeeded and had swept Washington
before him, he might have kept in communication with Burgoyne and have
co-operated with him. Failing in this, he decided to go by sea, and when
he was told that he could not safely land in the Delaware, went on to
Chesapeake bay. When he gained his object by taking Philadelphia he did
so by a course which made it impossible for him to co-operate with
Burgoyne, and put Washington's army between them.

According to the government plan the chief object of his campaign should
have been his junction with Burgoyne. The government, that is Germain,
certainly erred in not giving him precise orders, while Burgoyne had
virtually no discretionary power. Yet it was for Howe, as
commander-in-chief on the spot, to judge of the situation without
explicit instructions. According to his own statements, his view of the
situation was that Burgoyne would march through a friendly country and
encounter no enemy excep