rations might be given, but they
could not add to the conviction of the reader.
ARTICLE VI.
Aggressive Wars for Conquest and other Reasons.
There are two very different kinds of invasion: one attacks an adjoining
state; the other attacks a distant point, over intervening territory of
great extent whose inhabitants may be neutral, doubtful, or hostile.
Wars of conquest, unhappily, are often prosperous,--as Alexander, Caesar,
and Napoleon during a portion of his career, have fully proved. However,
there are natural limits in these wars, which cannot be passed without
incurring great disaster. Cambyses in Nubia, Darius in Scythia, Crassus
and the Emperor Julian among the Parthians, and Napoleon in Russia,
furnish bloody proofs of these truths.--The love of conquest, however,
was not the only motive with Napoleon: his personal position, and his
contest with England, urged him to enterprises the aim of which was to
make him supreme. It is true that he loved war and its chances; but he
was also a victim to the necessity of succeeding in his efforts or of
yielding to England. It might be said that he was sent into this world
to teach generals and statesmen what they should avoid. His victories
teach what may be accomplished by activity, boldness, and skill; his
disasters, what might have been avoided by prudence.
A war of invasion without good reason--like that of Genghis Khan--is a
crime against humanity; but it may be excused, if not approved, when
induced by great interests or when conducted with good motives.
The invasions of Spain of 1808 and of 1823 differed equally in object
and in results: the first was a cunning and wanton attack, which
threatened the existence of the Spanish nation, and was fatal to its
author; the second, while combating dangerous principles, fostered the
general interests of the country, and was the more readily brought to a
successful termination because its object met with the approval of the
majority of the people whose territory was invaded.
These illustrations show that invasions are not necessarily all of the
same character. The first contributed largely to the fall of Napoleon;
the second restored the relation between France and Spain, which ought
never to have been changed.
Let us hope that invasions may be rare. Still, it is better to attack
than to be invaded; and let us remember that the surest way to check the
spirit of conquest and usurpation is to oppose it by
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