tions, he would perhaps
have failed in his mission, or at least made the war a long and bloody
one, by exciting the national spirit by an occupation of the country
similar to that of 1807.
Emboldened by the hearty welcome of the people, he comprehended that it
was a political operation rather than a military one, and that it
behooved him to consummate it rapidly. His conduct, so different from
that of the allies in 1793, deserves careful attention from all charged
with similar missions. In three months the army was under the walls of
Cadiz.
If the events now transpiring in the Peninsula prove that statesmanship
was not able to profit by success in order to found a suitable and solid
order of things, the fault was neither in the army nor in its
commanders, but in the Spanish government, which, yielding to the
counsel of violent reactionaries, was unable to rise to the height of
its mission. The arbiter between two great hostile interests, Ferdinand
blindly threw himself into the arms of the party which professed a deep
veneration for the throne, but which intended to use the royal authority
for the furtherance of its own ends, regardless of consequences. The
nation remained divided in two hostile camps, which it would not have
been impossible to calm and reconcile in time. These camps came anew
into collision, as I predicted in Verona in 1823,--a striking lesson, by
which no one is disposed to profit in that beautiful and unhappy land,
although history is not wanting in examples to prove that violent
reactions, any more than revolutions, are not elements with which to
construct and consolidate. May God grant that from this frightful
conflict may emerge a strong and respected monarchy, equally separated
from all factions, and based upon a disciplined army as well as upon the
general interests of the country,--a monarchy capable of rallying to its
support this incomprehensible Spanish nation, which, with merits not
less extraordinary than its faults, was always a problem for those who
were in the best position to know it.
ARTICLE VIII.
National Wars.
National wars, to which we have referred in speaking of those of
invasion, are the most formidable of all. This name can only be applied
to such as are waged against a united people, or a great majority of
them, filled with a noble ardor and determined to sustain their
independence: then every step is disputed, the army holds only its
camp-ground, its suppl
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