apturing fortresses, the allies had informed the
commanders of those fortresses that they contemplated no wrong to
France, to her forts or her brave armies, and had marched on Paris with
two hundred thousand men. They might have restored the monarchy; and,
again, they might never have returned, at least without the protection
of an equal force on their retreat to the Rhine. It is difficult to
decide this, since the experiment was never made, and as all would have
depended upon the course of the French nation and the army. The problem
thus presents two equally grave solutions. The campaign of 1793 gave
one; whether the other might have been obtained, it is difficult to say.
Experiment alone could have determined it.

The military precepts for such wars are nearly the same as for national
wars, differing, however, in a vital point. In national wars the country
should be occupied and subjugated, the fortified places besieged and
reduced, and the armies destroyed; whereas in wars of opinion it is of
less importance to subjugate the country; here great efforts should be
made to gain the end speedily, without delaying for details, care being
constantly taken to avoid any acts which might alarm the nation for its
independence or the integrity of its territory.

The war in Spain in 1823 is an example which may be cited in favor of
this course in opposition to that of the Revolution. It is true that the
conditions were slightly different; for the French army of 1792 was
made up of more solid elements than that of the Radicals of the Isla de
Leon. The war of the Revolution was at once a war of opinion, a national
war, and a civil war,--while, if the first war in Spain in 1808 was
thoroughly a national war, that of 1823 was a partial struggle of
opinions without the element of nationality; and hence the enormous
difference in the results.

Moreover, the expedition of the Duke of Angouleme was well carried out.
Instead of attacking fortresses, he acted in conformity to the
above-mentioned precepts. Pushing on rapidly to the Ebro, he there
divided his forces, to seize, at their sources, all the elements of
strength of their enemies,--which they could safely do, since they were
sustained by a majority of the inhabitants. If he had followed the
instructions of the Ministry, to proceed methodically to the conquest of
the country and the reduction of the fortresses between the Pyrenees and
the Ebro, in order to provide a base of opera