om a contest with
Austria assisted by an auxiliary force of a given strength. These latter
contests belong to ordinary wars.

It follows, then, in general, that double wars should be avoided if
possible, and, if cause of war be given by two states, it is more
prudent to dissimulate or neglect the wrongs suffered from one of them,
until a proper opportunity for redressing them shall arrive. The rule,
however, is not without exception: the respective forces, the
localities, the possibility of finding allies to restore, in a measure,
equality of strength between the parties, are circumstances which will
influence a government so threatened. We now have fulfilled our task, in
noting both the danger and the means of remedying it.

CHAPTER II.

MILITARY POLICY.

We have already explained what we understand by this title. It embraces
the moral combinations relating to the operations of armies. If the
political considerations which we have just discussed be also moral,
there are others which influence, in a certain degree, the conduct of a
war, which belong neither to diplomacy, strategy, nor tactics. We
include these under the head of _Military Policy_.

Military policy may be said to embrace all the combinations of any
projected war, except those relating to the diplomatic art and strategy;
and, as their number is considerable, a separate article cannot be
assigned to each without enlarging too much the limits of this work, and
without deviating from my intention,--which is, not to give a treatise
on theses subjects, but to point out their relations to military
operations.

Indeed, in this class we may place the passions of the nation to be
fought, their military system, their immediate means and their reserves,
their financial resources, the attachment they bear to their government
or their institutions, the character of the executive, the characters
and military abilities of the commanders of their armies, the influence
of cabinet councils or councils of war at the capital upon their
operations, the system of war in favor with their staff, the established
force of the state and its armament, the military geography and
statistics of the state which is to be invaded, and, finally, the
resources and obstacles of every kind likely to be met with, all of
which are included neither in diplomacy nor in strategy.

There are no fixed rules on such subjects, except that the government
should neglect nothing in obtain