eral millions
of acres of their holdings to speculators and prospective settlers, and
following the rescinding act some of these took counsel with Alexander
Hamilton as to their rights. In an opinion which was undoubtedly known
to the Court when it decided Fletcher _v._ Peck, Hamilton characterized
the repeal as contravening "the first principles of natural justice and
social policy," especially so far as it was made, "to the prejudice
* * * of third persons * * * innocent of the alleged fraud or
corruption; * * * [Moreover, he added,] the Constitution of the United
States, article first, section tenth, declares that no State shall pass
a law impairing the obligations of contract. This must be equivalent to
saying no State shall pass a law revoking, invalidating, or altering a
contract. Every grant from one to another, whether the grantor be a
State or an individual, is virtually a contract that the grantee shall
hold and enjoy the thing granted against the grantor, and his
representatives. It, therefore, appears to me that taking the terms of
the Constitution in their large sense, and giving them effect according
to the general spirit and policy of the provisions, the revocation of
the grant by the act of the legislature of Georgia may justly be
considered as contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and,
therefore null. And that the courts of the United States, in cases
within their jurisdiction, will be likely to pronounce it so."[1612] In
the debate to which the "Yazoo Land Frauds," as they were
contemporaneously known, gave rise in Congress, Hamilton's views were
quoted frequently.

So far as it invokes the obligation of contracts clause, Marshall's
opinion in Fletcher _v._ Peck performs two creative acts. He recognizes
that an obligatory contract is one still to be performed--in other
words, is an executory contract; also that a grant of land is an
executed contract--a conveyance. But, he asserts, every grant is
attended by "an implied contract" on the part of the grantor not to
claim again the thing granted. Thus, grants are brought within the
category of contracts having continuing obligation and so within article
I, Sec. 10. But the question still remained of the nature of this
obligation. Marshall's answer to this can only be inferred from his
statement at the end of his opinion. The State of Georgia, he says, "was
restrained" from the passing of the rescinding act "either by general
principles which