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rove the contrary.[1657] Since then the rule has been applied many times in justification of State regulation of railroads,[1658] and even of the application of a State prohibition law to a company which had been chartered expressly to manufacture beer.[1659] The Strict Construction of Public Grants Long, however, before the cases last cited were decided, the principle which they illustrate had come to be powerfully reinforced by two others, the first of which is that all charter privileges and immunities are to be strictly construed as against the claims of the State; or as it is otherwise often phrased, "nothing passes by implication in a public grant." The Charles River Bridge Case.--The leading case is that of the Charles River Bridge Company _v._ Warren Bridge Company,[1660] which was decided shortly after Chief Justice Marshall's death by a substantially new Court. The question at issue was whether the charter of the complaining company, which authorized it to operate a toll bridge, stood in the way of the State's permitting another company of later date to operate a free bridge in the immediate vicinity. Inasmuch as the first company could point to no clause in its charter which specifically vested it with an exclusive right, the Court held the charter of the second company to be valid on the principle just stated. Justice Story, who remained from the old Bench, presented a vigorous dissent, in which he argued cogently, but unavailingly, that the monopoly claimed by the Charles River Bridge Company was fully as reasonable an implication from the terms of its charter and the circumstances surrounding its concession as perpetuity had been from the terms of the Dartmouth College charter and the environing transaction. The Court was in fact making new law, because it was looking at things from a new point of view. This was the period when judicial recognition of the Police Power began to take on a doctrinal character. It was also the period when the railroad business was just beginning. Chief Justice Taney's opinion evinces the influence of both these developments. The power of the State to provide for its own internal happiness and prosperity was not, he asserted, to be pared away by mere legal intendments; nor was its ability to avail itself of the lights of modern science to be frustrated by obsolete interests such as those of the old turnpike companies, the charter privileges of which, he apprehended,
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