does not appear that the Supreme Court of the United
States has ever done so.[1652]
Quite different is it with the distinction pointed out in the cases
between the franchises and privileges which a corporation derives from
its charter and the rights of property and contract which accrue to it
in the course of its existence. Even the outright repeal of the former
does not wipe out the latter or cause them to escheat to the State. The
primary heirs of the defunct organization are its creditors; but
whatever of value remains after their valid claims are met goes to the
former shareholders.[1653] By the earlier weight of authority, on the
other hand, persons who contract with companies whose charters are
subject to legislative amendment or repeal do so at their own risk: any
"such contracts made between individuals and the corporation do not vary
or in any manner change or modify the relation between the State and the
corporation in respect to the right of the State to alter, modify, or
amend such a charter, * * *"[1654] But later holdings becloud this
rule.[1655]
Corporations As Persons Subject To The Law.--But suppose the
State neglects to reserve the right to amend, alter, or repeal--is it,
then, without power to control its corporate creatures? By no means.
Private corporations, like other private persons, are always presumed to
be subject to the legislative power of the State; from which it follows
that immunities conferred by charter are to be treated as exceptions to
an otherwise controlling rule. This principle was recognized by Chief
Justice Marshall in the case of Providence Bank _v._ Billings,[1656] in
which he held that in the absence of express stipulation or reasonable
implication to the contrary in its charter, the bank was subject to the
taxing power of the State, notwithstanding that the power to tax is the
power to destroy.
Corporations and the Police Power.--And of course the same
principle is equally applicable to the exercise by the State of its
police powers. Thus, in what was perhaps the leading case before the
Civil War, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that the legislature of
that State had the right, in furtherance of the public safety, to
require chartered companies operating railways to fence in their tracks
and provide cattle yards. In a matter of this nature, said the Court,
corporations are on a level with individuals engaged in the same
business, unless, from their charter, they can p
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