ustria's troops from the beginning
of the war; unlucky generals--Dankl, Auffenberg, and others--had been
relieved of their commands and replaced by "new blood"--Boehm-Ermolli,
Boroyevitch von Bojna, and Von Pflanzer-Baltin. Of these three, two
had as yet failed in carrying to success the German plans which had
taken the place of those of their own strategists. Hence it is not at
all improbable that the reports of dissensions among the garrison,
which leaked out at the time, were substantially accurate. That
jealousies broke out among the numerous races forming the Austrian
Army--especially between the Slavonic and Germanic elements--is
supported by strong evidence. The sentiments of the Slav subjects of
Austria leaned more toward Russia than the empire of which they formed
a considerable portion, while there was never any love lost between
them and the Magyars. However that may be, the Slav regiments were
reported to have refused obedience to the general's order for the last
sortie, which was eventually undertaken by a force composed of the
Twenty-third Hungarian Honved Division, a regiment of Hussars, and a
Landwehr brigade, altogether about 30,000 men. Everything depended
upon the venture, for not only were all their food supplies used up,
but they had already eaten most of their horses. Instead, therefore,
of making southward to where their comrades were fighting hard to tear
themselves away from the Carpathian passes, the sortie turned toward
the east, in the direction of Mosciska, twenty miles off, which was
supposed to be the Russian supply base. This attempted foraging
expedition--for it was nothing else--can only be defended on the broad
general principle that it is better to do something than nothing as a
last resort. Supplies were essential before any more could be
undertaken to cut a passage through the strong double set of Russian
lines that lay between the Carpathians and Przemysl; but that these
supplies were stored at Mosciska was a pure speculation. Further,
considering that the whole country was in their opponents' hands, a
strength of 30,000 men was insufficient to attempt so hazardous an
adventure. Even if they succeeded in breaking through, their return to
the fortress was not assured. In that case, if they could not get
back, they would have to go forward: eastward lay Lemberg, held by the
Russians; northward was the Russian frontier, and southward stood the
Russian forces holding the passes. Thus, i
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