the fortress was to be expected any hour. Having so
far held the Germanic armies in check, it was necessary for the
Russians to regain complete control of the Carpathians and the passes
before the snow should begin to melt, especially if they decided on an
invasion of Hungary. On the other hand, before any offensive could be
undertaken against the Germans in Poland, or the Austrians at Cracow,
it was imperative to secure the southern flank in Galicia. They had by
this time partially grasped one particular feature of German strategy,
namely, to parry a blow from one direction by striking in another. A
further consideration may have been the absolute certainty that
Germany would dispatch more reenforcements to the aid of her ally.
Selivanoff's siege army was distributed between Dmitrieff, Brussilov,
and Ivanoff, but they could not be employed to full advantage owing to
the restricted area presented by the Germanic front. Being largely
composed of siege artillery as well as cavalry, a considerable portion
of Selivanoff's army was unsuited for mountain warfare. Cavalry were
converted into infantry, but could not be supplied with the necessary
equipment; they had no bayonets, and most of the fighting was
hand-to-hand.
Great masses of Germanic reserves were concentrating in northern
Hungary, into which the Russians had driven a thin wedge south of
Dukla, where they held an isolated outpost near Bartfeld. To leave
this position undeveloped meant compulsory withdrawal or disaster.
With the continual influx of reenforcements on both sides, the
struggle for the main passes gradually develops into an ever-expanding
and unbroken battle front: all the gaps are being filled up. From
Dukla westward to the Dunajec-Biala line and the Carpathian foothills
a new link is formed by the Fourth Austrian Army, commanded by the
Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, with two and a half army corps and one
German division. In the Central Carpathians a fifth army, under the
command of the Austrian General von Bojna, appears between the forces
of Boehm-Ermolli and those of Von Linsingen. Right away eastward the
purely Austrian army of Von Pflanzer-Baltin was holding the Pruth
Valley. The Germanic chain was complete, with every link welded
together.
When the Russian offensive opened on March 19, 1915, the entire battle
line still rested on the northern side of the Carpathians, and here
the struggle was resumed. The Russian grand attack was directed
betwee
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