s of artillery with ample munitions, and the
railroads had been wrecked by the retreating Russians. What has been
described by military writers as "Von Mackensen's phalanx" was a
concentration of troops along the lines on which the strongest
resistance was expected or where the quickest advance was intended. No
special group of forces appear to have been set apart for that
purpose; there was very little shifting about or regrouping necessary
during the campaign, and so well was the plan arranged that the
concentrations occurred almost automatically wherever and whenever
they were most needed. The infantry marched in successive lines or
echelons, about forty yards apart, while in the ranks the men were
allowed about four feet elbow room apiece. For frontal attacks this
might be considered fairly close formation, but Von Mackensen
calculated more upon the disintegrating effect of his artillery to
first demoralize the enemy and wreck his position, after which the
infantry came into play to complete the destruction. Without an
overwhelming supply of artillery the "phalanx" plan would have been
unworkable--machine guns would exact too heavy a sacrifice of life.
Ivanoff's chief object for the moment was to hold the enemy in check
long enough to allow Przemysl to be cleared of ammunitions and
supplies, and to withdraw the troops in possession of the place.
Already, on May 14, 1915, the German troops of Von Mackensen's army
had occupied Jaroslav, only twenty-two miles north of the fortress.
Ivanoff had concentrated his strongest forces on the line between
Sieniava, north of Przevorsk, and Sambor, thirty miles southeast of
Przemysl. Here he had deployed the three armies which had held the
entire front from the Biala to Uzsok in the beginning of May, 1915,
nearly twice as long as the line they were now guarding. These were to
fight a holding battle on the center while he adopted a series of
vigorous counterthrusts on his right and left wings. By the retirement
of the center Ewarts had been compelled to fall back from the Nida to
the Vistula with Woyrsch's Austrian army against him. When Ewarts
dropped behind Kielce in Russian Poland, Woyrsch seized the junction
of the branch line to Ostroviecs in front of the Russian line. Ivanoff
decided to venture a counterattack which would at the same time
relieve the pressure on his center and also check the move on Josefov,
dangerously near to the Warsaw-Ivangorod-Lublin line. The result o
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