y. The lack of big guns was
undoubtedly the reason why the Russians had not attempted an invasion
of Hungary. Hence they stuck to the mountain passes where their
opponents were unable to carry their artillery, although they were
amply supplied with the same. It is true that the Russians could have
produced an equal--or even greater--number of men, but they had not
the arms and accouterments.

Speaking from safe knowledge after the event, it is possible to
indicate with moderate accuracy at least one of the ingenious
stratagems adopted by the Germans to disguise their tremendous
preparations against the Dunajec line. For months the fighting in this
region had never been severe. When, therefore, local attacks and
counterattacks on a small scale started on the Biala, as far back as
April 4, 1915, Dmitrieff and his staff regarded this activity on the
Austrians part as merely a continuation of the sporadic assaults they
had grown accustomed to. Besides holding his own, Dmitrieff had on
several occasions been able to assist Brussilov on his left. Until the
big German drive commenced they had only been opposed to three
Austro-German army corps and a Prussian division; now there were
twelve corps on their front, supplied with enormous resources of
artillery, shells, and cavalry. Most serious of all, Dmitrieff had
neglected to construct second and third lines to which he could retire
in an emergency. Of the rivers that lay behind him--the Wisloka, the
Wistok, and the San--the first would be useful to cover Brussilov's
position at the western passes, but beyond that he could not retreat
without imperiling the whole Carpathian right flank. It was on this
very calculation that the German plan--simple but effective--was
based. The Russian grip on the Carpathians could only be released
either by forcing a clear road through any pass into Galicia, or by
turning one of the extreme flanks. Had the Austrians succeeded in
breaking through as far as Jaslo, Dmitrieff would have been cut off
and Brussilov forced to withdraw--followed by the whole line. The same
result would follow if a thrust from the Bukowina succeeded in
recapturing Lemberg. Both methods had been attempted, and both had
failed. Germany's overwhelming superiority in artillery could not be
effectively displayed in mountain warfare, but Dmitrieff's position on
the Dunajec offered an easy avenue of approach.

At the eleventh hour Dmitrieff grasped the situation and applied t