e lull. It was a short winter
pause during which the opposing forces--on one side at least--were
preparing and gathering the requisite momentum for the coming storm.
During January, 1915, the Russian armies were in a decidedly favorable
position. In their own invaded territory of Poland, as we have seen,
they held an advanced position in front of the Vistula, which
circumstance enabled them to utilize that river as a line of
communication, while barring the way to Warsaw against Von Hindenburg.
Lemberg, the capital of Galicia, which they had captured in September,
1914, was still in their hands. Sixty miles away to the west there lay
the great fortress of Przemysl, invested by the Russians under General
Selivanoff, and completely cut off from the outer world since November
12, 1914. At least 150,000 troops and enormous quantities of stores
and munitions were locked up in the town and outlying forts, together
with a population of 50,000 inhabitants, mostly Polish. In addition to
these material advantages, the Russians held all the Carpathian passes
leading from Galicia into the vast plains of Hungary, and a strong
advanced position on the Dunajec in the west, which, besides
threatening Cracow, the capital of Austrian Poland, served also as a
screen to the mountain operations. Finally, to the far east of the
range, they had occupied nearly the whole of the Bukowina right up to
the Rumanian frontier.
Such, briefly, was the situation on the Austro-Russian front when the
second winter campaign opened. For Austria the situation was extremely
critical. Her armies, broken and scattered after a series of
disastrous reverses, could scarcely hope by their own efforts to stem
the threatened invasion of Hungary. General Brussilov, however, made
no serious attempt to pour his troops through the passes into the
plain below; although what was probably a reconnaissance emerged from
the Uzsok Pass and penetrated as far as Munkacs, some thirty miles
south, while on several occasions small bands of Cossacks descended
from the Dukla and Delatyn (Jablonitza) passes to raid Hungarian
villages. General Brussilov evidently regarded it inadvisable to risk
an invasion of the plain, especially as he did not hold control of the
southern exits from the passes, beyond which he would be exposed to
attack from all sides and liable to encounter superior forces. The
main Austrian anxiety for the moment was the precarious position of
Przemysl, to reli
|