en He puts on 'glorious
apparel.'

3. Let us look, however, at the two translations of the same verse.

In the vulgate it is "Dominus regnavit; decorem indutus est;" He has put on
'becomingness,'--decent apparel, rather than glorious.

In the Septuagint it is [Greek: euprepeia]--_well_-becomingness; an
expression which, if the reader considers, must imply certainly the
existence of an opposite idea of possible '_ill_-becomingness,'--of an
apparel which should, in just as accurate a sense, belong appropriately to
the creature invested with it, and yet not be glorious, but inglorious, and
not well-becoming, but ill-becoming. The mandrill's blue nose, for
instance, already referred to,--can we rightly speak of this as '[Greek:
euprepeia]'? Or the stings, and minute, colourless blossoming of the
nettle? May we call these a glorious apparel, as we may the glowing of an
alpine rose?

You will find on reflection, and find more convincingly the more accurately
you reflect, that there is an absolute sense attached to such words as
'decent,' 'honourable,' 'glorious,' or '[Greek: kalos],' contrary to
another absolute sense in the words 'indecent,' 'shameful,' 'vile,' or
'[Greek: aischros].' {89}

And that there is every degree of these absolute qualities visible in
living creatures; and that the divinity of the Mind of man is in its
essential discernment of what is [Greek: kalon] from what is [Greek:
aischron], and in his preference of the kind of creatures which are decent,
to those which are indecent; and of the kinds of thoughts, in himself,
which are noble, to those which are vile.

4. When therefore I said that Mr. Darwin, and his school,[25] had no
conception of the real meaning of the word 'proper,' I meant that they
conceived the qualities of things only as their 'properties,' but not as
their becomingnesses;' and seeing that dirt is proper to a swine, malice to
a monkey, poison to a nettle, and folly to a fool, they called a nettle
_but_ a nettle, and the faults of fools but folly; and never saw the
difference between ugliness and beauty absolute, decency and indecency
absolute, glory or shame absolute, and folly or sense absolute.

[Illustration: FIG. 10.]

Whereas, the perception of beauty, and the power of defining physical
character, are based on moral instinct, and on the power of defining animal
or human character. Nor is it possible to say that one flower is more
highly developed, or one animal of a higher