t proper,
authorize the President to employ the force at his command to seize a
vessel belonging to an American citizen which had been illegally and
unjustly captured in a foreign port and restore it to its owner. But can
Congress only act after the fact, after the mischief has been done? Have
they no power to confer upon the President the authority in advance to
furnish instant redress should such a case afterwards occur? Must they
wait until the mischief has been done, and can they apply the remedy
only when it is too late? To confer this authority to meet future
cases under circumstances strictly specified is as clearly within the
war-declaring power as such an authority conferred upon the President by
act of Congress after the deed had been done. In the progress of a great
nation many exigencies must arise imperatively requiring that Congress
should authorize the President to act promptly on certain conditions
which may or may not afterwards arise. Our history has already presented
a number of such cases. I shall refer only to the latest.
Under the resolution of June 2, 1858, "for the adjustment of
difficulties with the Republic of Paraguay," the President is
"authorized to adopt such measures and use such force as in his
judgment may be necessary and advisable in the event of a refusal of
just satisfaction by the Government of Paraguay." "Just satisfaction"
for what? For "the attack on the United States steamer _Water Witch_"
and "other matters referred to in the annual message of the President."
Here the power is expressly granted upon the condition that the
Government of Paraguay shall refuse to render this "just satisfaction."
In this and other similar cases Congress have conferred upon the
President power in advance to employ the Army and Navy upon the
happening of contingent future events; and this most certainly is
embraced within the power to declare war.
Now, if this conditional and contingent power could be constitutionally
conferred upon the President in the case of Paraguay, why may it not be
conferred for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of
American citizens in the event that they may be violently and unlawfully
attacked in passing over the transit routes to and from California or
assailed by the seizure of their vessels in a foreign port? To deny this
power is to render the Navy in a great degree useless for the protection
of the lives and property of American citizens in countries w
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