of protecting the lives and
property of American citizens passing in transit across the Panama,
Nicaragua, and Tehuantepec routes against sudden and lawless outbreaks
and depredations. I shall not repeat the arguments employed in former
messages in support of this measure. Suffice it to say that the lives of
many of our people and the security of vast amounts of treasure passing
and repassing over one or more of these routes between the Atlantic and
Pacific may be deeply involved in the action of Congress on this
subject.

I would also again recommend to Congress that authority be given to
the President to employ the naval force to protect American merchant
vessels, their crews and cargoes, against violent and lawless seizure
and confiscation in the ports of Mexico and the Spanish American States
when these countries may be in a disturbed and revolutionary condition.
The mere knowledge that such an authority had been conferred, as I have
already stated, would of itself in a great degree prevent the evil.
Neither would this require any additional appropriation for the naval
service.

The chief objection urged against the grant of this authority is that
Congress by conferring it would violate the Constitution; that it
would be a transfer of the war-making, or, strictly speaking, the
war-declaring, power to the Executive. If this were well founded, it
would, of course, be conclusive. A very brief examination, however,
will place this objection at rest.

Congress possess the sole and exclusive power under the Constitution "to
declare war." They alone can "raise and support armies" and "provide
and maintain a navy." But after Congress shall have declared war and
provided the force necessary to carry it on the President, as Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy, can alone employ this force in making war
against the enemy. This is the plain language, and history proves that
it was the well-known intention of the framers, of the Constitution.

It will not be denied that the general "power to declare war" is without
limitation and embraces within itself not only what writers on the law
of nations term a public or perfect war, but also an imperfect war,
and, in short, every species of hostility, however confined or limited.
Without the authority of Congress the President can not fire a hostile
gun in any case except to repel the attacks of an enemy. It will not be
doubted that under this power Congress could, if they though