hilst this clause
may not be, and I believe is not, a violation of the Constitution,
yet how destructive it would be to all proper subordination and how
demoralizing its effect upon the morale of the Army if it should become
a precedent for future legislation! Officers might then be found,
instead of performing their appropriate duties, besieging the halls of
Congress for the purpose of obtaining special favors and choice places
by legislative enactment. Under these circumstances I have deemed it
but fair to inform Congress that whilst I do not consider the bill
unconstitutional, this is only because, in my opinion, Congress did not
intend by the language which they have employed to interfere with my
absolute authority to order Captain Meigs to any other service I might
deem expedient. My perfect right still remains, notwithstanding the
clause, to send him away from Washington to any part of the Union to
superintend the erection of a fortification or on any other appropriate
duty.

It has been alleged, I think without sufficient cause, that this
clause is unconstitutional because it has created a new office and has
appointed Captain Meigs to perform its duties. If it had done this, it
would have been a clear question, because Congress have no right to
appoint to any office, this being specially conferred upon the President
and Senate. It is evident that Congress intended nothing more by this
clause than to express a decided opinion that Captain Meigs should be
continued in the employment to which he had been previously assigned
by competent authority.

It is not improbable that another question of grave importance may arise
out of this clause. Is the appropriation conditional and will it fall
provided I do not deem it proper that it shall be expended under the
superintendence of Captain Meigs? This is a question which shall receive
serious consideration, because upon its decision may depend whether
the completion of the waterworks shall be arrested for another season.
It is not probable that Congress could have intended that this great
and important work should depend upon the various casualties and
vicissitudes incident to the natural or official life of a single
officer of the Army. This would be to make the work subordinate to the
man, and not the man to the work, and to reverse our great axiomatic
rule of "principles, not men." I desire to express no opinion upon the
subject. Should the question ever arise, it sha