untry. But the complaint is
against the _system_, against the _practice_, against the undisguised
attempt to secure the favor of the press by means addressed to its
pecuniary interest, and these means, too, drawn from the public
treasury, being no other than the appointed compensations for the
performance of official duties. Sir, the press itself should resent
this. Its own character for purity and independence is at stake. It
should resist a connection rendering it obnoxious to so many
imputations. It should point to its honorable denomination in our
constitutions of government, and it should maintain the character, there
ascribed to it, of a FREE PRESS.

There can, Sir, be no objection to the appointment of an editor to
office, if he is the fittest man. There can be no objection to
considering the services which, in that or in any other capacity, he may
have rendered his country. He may have done much to maintain her rights
against foreign aggression, and her character against insult. He may
have honored, as well as defended her; and may, therefore, be justly
regarded and selected, in the choice of faithful public agents. But the
ground of complaint is, that the aiding, by the press, of the election
of an individual, is rewarded, by that same individual, with the gift of
moneyed offices. Men are turned out of office, and others put in, and
receive salaries from the public treasury, on the ground, either openly
avowed or falsely denied, that they have rendered service in the
election of the very individual who makes this removal and makes this
appointment. Every man, Sir, must see that this is a vital stab at the
purity of the press. It not only assails its independence, by addressing
sinister motives to it, but it furnishes from the public treasury the
means of exciting these motives. It extends the executive power over the
press in a most daring manner. It operates to give a direction to
opinion, not favorable to the government, in the aggregate; not
favorable to the Constitution and laws; not favorable to the
legislature; but favorable to the executive alone. The consequence often
is, just what might be looked for, that the portion of the press thus
made fast to the executive interest denounces Congress, denounces the
judiciary, complains of the laws, and quarrels with the Constitution.
This exercise of the right of appointment to this end is an
augmentation, and a vast one, of the executive power, singly and alone.