l where; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you
at last, at a critical moment."

These remarks of Washington will not be found too severe if we remember
the conduct of our militia in the open field at Princeton, Savannah
River, Camden, Guilford Court-House, &c., in the war of the Revolution;
the great cost of the war of 1812 as compared with its military results;
the refusal of the New England militia to march beyond the lines of
their own states, and of the New-York militia to cross the Niagara and
secure a victory already won; or the disgraceful flight of the Southern
militia from the field of Bladensburg.

But there is another side to this picture. If our militia have
frequently failed to maintain their ground _when drawn up in the open
field_, we can point with pride to their brave and successful defence of
Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, Fort McHenry, Stonington, Niagara,
Plattsburg, in proof of what may be accomplished by militia in
connection with fortifications.

These examples from our history must fully demonstrate the great value
of a militia when properly employed as a defence against invasion, and
ought to silence the sneers of those who would abolish this arm of
defence as utterly useless. In the open field militia cannot in general
be manoeuvred to advantage; whereas, in the defence of fortified places
their superior intelligence and activity not unfrequently render them
even more valuable than regulars. And in reading the severe strictures
of Washington, Greene, Morgan, and others, upon our militia, it must be
remembered that they were at that time entirely destitute of important
works of defence; and the experience of all other nations, as well as
our own, has abundantly shown that a newly-raised force cannot cope, _in
the open field_, with one subordinate and disciplined. Here _science_
must determine the contest. Habits of strict obedience, and of
simultaneous and united action, are indispensable to carry out what the
higher principles of the military profession require. New and
undisciplined forces are often confounded at the evolutions, and
strategic and tactical combinations of a regular army, and lose all
confidence in their leaders and in themselves. But, when placed behind a
breastwork, they even overrate their security. They can then coolly look
upon the approaching columns, and, unmoved by glittering armor and
bristling bayonets, will exert all their skill in the use of