nted with these portions of our
history, can hesitate to ascribe much of the wantonness and duration of
the wrongs we endured, to a knowledge on the part of our assailants of
the scantiness and inefficiency of our military and naval force."

"If," said Mr. Calhoun, "disregarding the sound dictates of reason and
experience, we, in peace, neglect our military establishment, we must,
with a powerful and skilful enemy, be exposed to the most distressing
calamities."

These remarks were made in opposition to the reduction of our military
establishment, in 1821, below the standard of thirteen thousand.
Nevertheless, the force was reduced to about six or seven thousand; and
we were soon made to feel the consequences. It is stated, in a report of
high authority, that if there had been two regiments available near St.
Louis, in 1832, the war with Black Hawk would have been easily avoided;
and that it cannot be doubted that the scenes of devastation and savage
warfare which overspread the Floridas for nearly seven years would also
have been avoided, and some thirty millions have been saved the country,
if two regiments had been available at the beginning of that
conflict.[12]

[Footnote 12: We may now add to these remarks, that if our government
had occupied the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande with a
well-organized army of twelve thousand men, war with Mexico might have
been avoided; but to push forward upon Matamoras a small force of only
two thousand, in the very face of a large Mexican army was holding out
to them the strongest inducements to attack us. The temporary economy of
a few thousands in reducing our military establishment to a mere handful
of men, again results in a necessary expenditure of many millions of
dollars and a large sacrifice of human life.]

We must, in this country, if we heed either the dictates of reason or
experience, maintain in time of peace a skeleton military and naval
force, capable of being greatly expanded, in the event of danger, by
the addition of new troops.

Much energy and enterprise will always be imparted to an army or navy by
the addition of new forces. The strength thus acquired is sometimes in
even a far greater ratio than the increase of numbers. But it must be
remembered that these new elements are, of themselves, far inferior to
the old ones in discipline, steady courage, and perseverance. No general
can rely on the accuracy of their movements in the operations o