g to pieces his staggered troops,
forces them into retreat, and completes the victory. During this time
the whole line of the enemy should be kept occupied, so as to prevent
fresh troops from being concentrated on the threatened point.
The following maxims on battles may be studied with advantage:--1st.
_General battles_ are not to be fought but under the occurrence of one
of the following circumstances: when you are, from any cause, decidedly
superior to the enemy; when he is on the point of receiving
reinforcements, which will materially effect your relative strength;
when, if not beaten or checked, he will deprive you of supplies or
reinforcements, necessary to the continuance or success of your
operations; and, generally, when the advantage of winning the battle
will be greater than the disadvantage of losing it.
2d. Whatever may be your reason for risking a general battle, you ought
to regard as indispensable preliminaries,--a thorough knowledge of the
ground on which you are to act; an ample supply of ammunition; the most
perfect order in your fire-arms; hospital depots regularly established,
with surgeons, nurses, dressings, &c., sufficient for the accommodation
of the wounded; points of rendezvous established and known to the
commanders of corps; and an entire possession of the passes in your own
rear.
3d. The battle being fought and _won_, the victory must be followed up
with as much alacrity and vigor, as though nothing had been gained,--a
maxim very difficult of observance, (from the momentary disobedience
which pervades all troops flushed with conquest,) but with which an
able general will never dispense. No one knew better the use of this
maxim than Napoleon, and no one was a more strict and habitual observer
of it.
4th. The battle being fought and _lost_, it is your first duty to do
away the _moral_ effect of defeat,--the want of that self-respect and
self-confidence, which are its immediate followers, and which, so long
as they last, are the most powerful auxiliaries of your enemy. It is
scarcely necessary to remark that, to effect this object,--to reinspire
a beaten army with hope, and to reassure it of victory,--we must not
turn our backs on an enemy, without sometimes presenting to him our
front also;--we must not confide our safety to mere flight, but adopt
such measures as shall convince him that though wounded and overpowered,
we are neither disabled nor dismayed; and that we still possess e
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