e. In
both instances he has, as we think, overstated his point. The dignified
parts of the Constitution are more real and living, are more intimately
associated with the practical work of Government, than he was disposed
to allow. Popular deference is paid more to truth and less to fiction
than he supposed. It is eminently characteristic of the cautious English
temper, the distrust of sharp contrasts and clever paradoxes engrained
in his nature, that (so far as we remember) he never adopts the familiar
saying of Thiers, that a constitutional Prince _regne et ne gouverne
pas_. But his actual conception of the English monarchy approaches far
too near that misleading and mischievous fallacy.

It is a little strange that so devoted a disciple of Darwin, a writer
who applied the principle of Evolution with so much skill, insight, and
success, to the life of nations and the course of politics, should have
allowed so little weight to the natural selection which operates so
powerfully upon the character of hereditary Princes and aristocracies.
It is far from obvious why so close and careful an observer should have
drawn his illustrations of the working of constitutional monarchy so
exclusively from the past, and especially from the examples of George
III. and William IV., ignoring so completely the experience of the
present reign; the deep, lasting, and for the most part wholesome,
influence exercised in European politics by men like Leopold I., Prince
Albert, and the present Emperor of Germany. Prince Bismarck owes to
Royal favour and trust the foundation of his power, the strength which
enabled him in the teeth of a short-sighted Liberal opposition to create
that Prussian army, to carry out that ruthless but eminently successful
policy of blood and steel, which excluded Austria from her place in the
Confederation, put an end to the old dualism, and achieved the union of
Germany. Italy owes everything to Cavour; but she owed Cavour to Victor
Emmanuel. The selection of Russian, Austrian, and German ministers, the
consistency of their policy, the power or rather authority, most
judiciously used by the Crown at more than one critical period of recent
English history, completely refute Mr. Bagehot's theoretical and
historical doctrine that a Parliament must be wiser than an average
sovereign. He forgets that a Prince is exempt from the influence of
party, whose disastrous action in the great crisis of the national
fortunes has bee