motest chance of King Constantine, who was no mean
judge of warlike problems, letting his country in for so dubious an
enterprise.
We were not actually at war with the Ottoman Empire for another two
months. But hostilities had virtually become certain during the month
of October, and one morning in the latter part of that month the First
Lord sent a message across asking me to come over to his room and
discuss possibilities in connection with the Dardanelles. I found the
First Sea Lord (Prince Louis of Battenberg) and the Fourth Sea Lord
(Commodore C. F. Lambert) waiting, as well as Mr. Churchill, and we
sat round a table with all the maps and charts that were necessary for
our purpose spread out on it. The problem of mastering the Straits was
examined entirely from the point of view of a military operation based
upon, and supported by, naval power. If the question of a fleet attack
upon the defences within the defile was mentioned at all, it was only
referred to quite incidentally.
From my own observation on the spot, and as a result of later
examination of maps, charts, confidential reports, and so forth, I had
come to the conclusion that the key to the Dardanelles lay in the
Kilid Bahr plateau, which dominates the channel at its very narrowest
point from the European (Gallipoli Peninsula) side. By far the best
plan of gaining possession of this high ground would, I considered, be
to land, by surprise if possible, the biggest military force that
could be very rapidly put ashore on that long stretch of coast-line
practicable for troops to disembark from boats in fine weather, which
was situated about the locality that has since become immortalized as
Anzac Cove. A project on these lines is what we actually discussed
that morning in the First Lord's room. I pointed out the difficulties
and the dangers involved, _i.e._ the virtual impossibility of
effecting a real surprise, the perils inseparable from a
disembarkation in face of opposition, the certainty that the enemy was
even now improving the land defences of the Gallipoli Peninsula, and
the fact that, at the moment, we had no troops to carry such a scheme
out and that we were most unlikely to have any to spare for such an
object for months to come. One somewhat controversial tactical point I
gave particular attention to--the efficacy of the fire of warships
when covering a military landing and when endeavouring to silence
field-guns on shore; my own view was that
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