nce) proved inconvenient
in 1914-15. One wonders, indeed, whether it was ever seen by the
Admiralty experts at the time when they had Admiral Carden's plan of a
creeping naval attack upon the Dardanelles under consideration,
because the memorandum expressed considerable doubts as to the
efficacy of gun-fire from on board ship against the land, and the
event proved that these doubts were fully justified. Had I had a copy
in my possession I should certainly have shown it to Sir Ian, or else
to Braithwaite, with whom, as he had been a brother-Director on the
General Staff at the War Office for some months previously, I was in
close touch.

Sir Ian, the Report says, "dwelt strongly on the total absence of
information furnished him by the War Office staff," and he complained
very justly that the map, or maps, given him had proved inaccurate and
inadequate. Now, that reflected upon Generals Ewart and H. Wilson, who
had been holding the appointment of D.M.O. between 1906 and 1914, and
it reflected upon Sir N. Lyttelton, the late Lord Nicholson (actually
a member of the Commission) and Sir J. French, who had successively
been Chiefs of the General Staff during the same period. Topographical
information cannot be procured after hostilities have broken out; it
has to be obtained in advance. On noting what was said about this in
the "First Report" of the Dardanelles Commission, I asked to be
allowed to give evidence again, and the Commission were good enough to
recall me in due course. The object was, not to contest Sir I.
Hamilton's assertions but to point out that under the circumstances
of the case no blame was fairly attributable to those who were
responsible for information of some sort being available.

To have obtained full information as to the Gallipoli Peninsula and
the region around the Dardanelles, but especially as to the peninsula,
was a matter of money--and plenty of it. In no country in the world in
pre-war days was spying on fortified areas of strategical importance
without money a more unprofitable game than in the Ottoman dominions.
There were, on the other hand, few countries where money, if you had
enough of it, was more sure to procure you the information that you
required. Ever since the late General Brackenbury was at the head of
the Intelligence Department of the War Office in the eighties secret
funds have been at its disposal, but they have not been large, and
there have always been plenty of desirable