t together with Mr. Churchill, their relations verging on the
mutually affectionate, eager to discuss as colleagues the very
unpromising position of affairs on the shores of the Thracian
Chersonese.

From a very early stage in the Dardanelles venture there had been a
feeling in some quarters within the War Office that we ought to cut
our losses and clear out of the Gallipoli Peninsula, and that sending
out reinforcements to the Aegean which could ill be spared from other
scenes of warlike activity looked uncommonly like throwing good money
after bad. My friends at G.H.Q., from whom I used to hear frequently,
and who would look in when over on duty or on short leave, were
strongly of this opinion; but they naturally were somewhat biassed.
One took a long time to reconcile oneself to this idea, even when no
hope of real success remained. It was not until September indeed, and
after the decision had been come to to send out no more fresh troops
to Sir I. Hamilton, that I personally came to the conclusion that no
other course was open than to have done with the business and to come
away out of that with the least possible delay. Sir Ian had sent home
a trusted staff-officer, Major (now Major-General) the Hon. Guy
Dawnay, to report and to try to secure help. Dawnay fought his corner
resolutely and was loyalty itself to his chief, but the information
that he had to give and his appreciation of the situation as it stood
were the reverse of encouraging. By the middle of October, when the
Salonika affair had begun to create fresh demands on our limited
resources and when Sir C. Monro was sent out to take up command of the
Mediterranean [p.103] Expeditionary Force, any doubts which remained on the
subject had been dispelled, and I was glad to gather from the new
chief's attitude when he left that, in so far as he understood the
situation before satisfying himself of the various factors on the
spot, he leant towards complete and prompt evacuation.

If a withdrawal was to be effected, it was manifest that this ought to
be carried out as soon as possible in view of the virtual certainty of
bad weather during the winter months. But the War Council, which had
superseded the Dardanelles Committee, unfortunately appeared to halt
helplessly between two opinions. Even Sir C. Monro's uncompromising
recommendation failed to decide its members. Lord Kitchener was loth
to agree to the step, as he feared the effect which a British retreat
mi