action and reaction of
cause and consequence, which limits and modifies any general statement
of a political truth. I am stating general principles--not defining
modifications and exceptions with the precision of a mathematical
proposition or a bill in chancery. The truth remains intact and
incontrovertible, that the existence of African servitude was in no wise
the cause of the conflict, but only an incident. In the later
controversies that arose, however, its effect in operating as a lever
upon the passions, prejudices, or sympathies of mankind, was so potent
that it has been spread, like a thick cloud, over the whole horizon of
historic truth.
As for the institution of negro servitude, it was a matter entirely
subject to the control of the States. No power was ever given to the
General Government to interfere with it, but an obligation was imposed
to protect it. Its existence and validity were distinctly recognized by
the Constitution in at least three places:
First, in that part of the second section of the first article which
prescribes that "representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective members, which shall be determined by
adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to
service for a term of years, and, excluding Indians not taxed, three
fifths of all other persons." "_Other_ persons" than "_free_ persons"
and those "bound to service for a term of years" must, of course, have
meant those permanently bound to service.
Secondly, it was recognized by the ninth section of the same article,
which provided that "the migration or importation of such persons as any
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit shall not be
prohibited by Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and
eight." This was a provision inserted for the protection of the
interests of the slave-trading New England States, forbidding any
prohibition of the trade by Congress for twenty years, and thus
virtually giving sanction to the legitimacy of the demand which that
trade was prosecuted to supply, and which was its only object.
Again, and in the third place, it was specially recognized, and an
obligation imposed upon every State, not only to refrain from
interfering with it in any other State, but in certain cases to aid in
its enforcement, by that clause, or paragraph, of the second section of
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