order to final
ratification, and there was serious reason to fear that this consent
could not be obtained. Rhode Island, as we have seen, had declined to
send any representatives to the Convention; of the three delegates from
New York, two had withdrawn; and other indications of dissatisfaction
had appeared. In case of the failure of a single Legislature to ratify,
the labors of the Convention would go for naught, under a strict
adherence to the letter of the article above cited. The danger of a
total frustration of their efforts was imminent.
In this emergency the Convention took the responsibility of transcending
the limits of their instructions, and recommending a procedure which was
in direct contravention of the letter of the Articles of Confederation.
This was the introduction of a provision into the new Constitution, that
the ratification of _nine_ States should be sufficient for its
establishment among themselves. In order to validate this provision, it
was necessary to refer it to authority higher than that of Congress and
the State Legislatures--that is, to the People of the States, assembled,
by their representatives, in convention. Hence it was provided, by the
seventh and last article of the new Constitution, that "the ratification
of the _Conventions_ of nine States" should suffice for its
establishment "between the States so ratifying the same."
There was another reason, of a more general and perhaps more controlling
character, for this reference to conventions for ratification, even if
entire unanimity of the State Legislatures could have been expected.
Under the American theory of republican government, conventions of the
people, duly elected and accredited as such, are invested with the
plenary power inherent in the people of an organized and independent
community, assembled in mass. In other words, they represent and
exercise what is properly the _sovereignty_ of the people. State
Legislatures, with restricted powers, do not possess or represent
sovereignty. Still less does the Congress of a union or confederacy of
States, which is by two degrees removed from the seat of sovereignty. We
sometimes read or hear of "delegated sovereignty," "divided
sovereignty," with other loose expressions of the same sort; but no such
thing as a division or delegation of sovereignty is possible.
In order, therefore, to supersede the restraining article above cited
and to give the highest validity to the compact f
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