he United States can be denied. That is the whole force and
effect of it--I mean so far as this argument is concerned. All
that can be claimed for it is, that by implication, perhaps, it
would permit that to be done. The XV. Amendment comes in and
says, in express terms, that that which the second section by
implication permits, shall not be done; and by this declaration
it strikes out that section, and it is no more in the
Constitution now than is that clause of the second section of the
first article of the Constitution which permitted States to deny
suffrage to any of their citizens--black or white. That section
is gone. It is no more a part of the Constitution, because it has
been absolutely repealed by the adoption of the XIV. Amendment.
Just so this second section of the XIV. Amendment disappeared by
the operation of the XV. Amendment.
SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation. (15 Stat., p. 345.)
The CHIEF JUSTICE.--There is a very strong implication, is there
not, in that Amendment, that you may deny the right of suffrage
for other causes.
Mr. MILLER.--I do not think there can be any implication by which
a citizen may be robbed of a fundamental right. It must be
something expressed. I do not believe in any power of taking away
the rights of citizens by construction. No human being can be
robbed of his God-given rights by implication. You can not take
away his property by implication. You can not take away his
liberty. I think it is equally true that you can not take away
his right of self-government by implication.
Finally, in regard to the construction of this XIV. Amendment, it
must be observed that it is remedial in its character, and it
must be "construed liberally to carry out the beneficent
principles it was intended to embody," (Dwarris on Statutory Law,
p. 632,) and that "its construction must be extended to other
cases within the reason and rule of it." (Lord Mansfield in
Atcheson _vs._ Everett, Cowper, 382, 391.) Lieber's fourteenth
rule o
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