ing the ordinary certificates of character and
qualifications. The license was refused, and it was stated as a
sufficient reason, that under the decisions of this court the
applicant, as a married woman, would be bound neither by her
express contracts, nor by those implied contracts which it is the
policy of the law to create between attorney and client. Since
the announcement of our decision, the applicant has filed a
printed argument in which her right to a license is earnestly and
ably maintained. Of the ample qualifications of the applicant we
have no doubt, and we put our decision in writing in order that
she or other persons interested may bring the question before the
next Legislature.

The applicant, in her printed argument, combats the decision of
the court in the case of Carpenter _vs._ Mitchell, June term,
1869, in which we held a married woman was not bound by contracts
having no relation to her own property. We are not inclined to go
over again the grounds of that decision. It was the result of a
good deal of deliberation and discussion in our council chamber,
and the confidence of the present members of this court in its
correctness can not easily be shaken. We are in accord with all
the courts in this country which have had occasion to pass upon a
similar question, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Conway _vs._
Smith, 13 Wis., 125, differing from us only on the minor point as
to whether, in regard to contracts concerning the separate
property of married women, the law side of the court would take
jurisdiction.

As to the main question, the right of married women to make
contracts not affecting their separate property, the position of
those who assert such right is, that because the Legislature has
expressly removed the common law disabilities of married women in
regard to holding property not derived from their husbands, it
has therefore, by necessary implication, also removed all their
common law disabilities in regard to making contracts, and
invited them to enter, equally with men, upon those fields of
trade and speculation by which property is acquired through the
agency of contracts.

The hiatus between the premise and the conclusion is too wide for
us to bridge. It may be desirable that the Legislature should