relieve married women from all their common law disabilities. But
to say that it has done so in the Act of 1861, the language of
which is carefully guarded, and which makes no allusion to
contracts, and does not use that or any equivalent term, would be
simple misinterpretation. It would be going as far beyond the
meaning of that act as that act goes beyond the common law in
changing the legal status of women. The act itself is wise and
just, and therefore entitled to a liberal interpretation.

This we have endeavored to give it in the cases that have come
before us, but we do not intend to decide that the Legislature
has gone to a length in its measure of reform for which the
language it has carefully used furnishes no warrant.

It is urged, however, that the law of the last session of the
Legislature, which gives to married women the separate control of
their earnings, must be construed as giving to them the right to
contract in regard to their personal services. This act had no
application to the case of Carpenter _vs._ Mitchell, having been
passed after that suit was commenced, and we were unmindful of it
when considering this application at the last term. Neither do we
now propose to consider how far it extends the power of a married
woman to contract, since, after further consultation in regard to
this application, we find ourselves constrained to hold that the
sex of the applicant, independently of coverture; is, as our law
now stands, a sufficient reason for not granting this license.

Although an attorney-at-law is an agent, as claimed by the
applicant's argument, when he has been retained to act for
another, yet he is also much more than an agent. He is an officer
of the court, holding his commission in this State, from two of
the members of this court, and subject to be disbarred by this
court for what our statute calls "mal-conduct in his office." He
is appointed to assist in the administration of justice, is
required to take an oath of office, and is privileged from arrest
while attending courts.

Our statute provides that no person shall be permitted to
practice as an attorney or counselor-at-law, without having
previously obtained a license for that purpose from two of the
justices of the Supreme Court. By the second section