r
treason; but it is nowhere provided that a citizen shall be
disfranchised for being a married woman. The opinion of the court
below puts a limitation upon this unlimited constitutional
provision. If this court shall approve this exception, in the
very teeth of the unambiguous language of the Constitution, where
may we expect judicial legislation to stop? Can this court say
that married women have no rights that are to be respected? Can
this court say that, when the XIV. Amendment speaks of all
persons, etc., and declares them to be citizens, it means all
male persons and unmarried females? Or can this court say that,
when the XIV. Amendment declares "the privileges of no citizen
shall be abridged," it means that the privileges of no male
citizen or unmarried female citizen shall be abridged? This would
be bold dealing with the constitutional provision. It would be
excluding a large proportion of the citizens of the United States
from privileges which the Constitution declares shall be the
inheritance of every citizen alike.

But it is respectfully submitted that the court below erred in
holding that a married woman, admitted to the bar under the XIV.
Amendment, would not be liable on contracts, express or implied,
between her and her clients. In Wisconsin, when the Legislature
passed the act protecting married women in the enjoyment of their
separate estate, our court, upon reasoning that can not be
gainsaid, held that the Legislature must have intended all the
natural and logical results of the act in question; and,
therefore, that the contracts of a married woman, relating to her
separate estate, were as binding as if made by a _feme sole_. It
is submitted that, for still stronger reasons, the great
innovation of the XIV. Amendment should be carried to its logical
conclusion, and that it sweeps away the principles of the common
law, as it does the express provisions of State constitutions and
statutes.

But again: Mrs. Bradwell, admitted to the bar, becomes an officer
of the court, subject to its summary jurisdiction. Any
malpractice or unprofessional conduct towards her client would be
punishable by fine, imprisonment, or expulsion from the bar, or
by all three. Her clients would, therefore, not be compelled to
resort to acti