s performed in
pursuance of the authority it confers. If it gives the
rights of a sole ownership, it must impose the liabilities
incident to such an act.

In Brownell _vs._ Dixon, 39 Ill., 207. this court not only held,
under the act of 1861, that a married woman possessed of separate
property might employ "an agent to transact her business", but
that she might employ her own husband as such agent.

Relying upon the doctrine laid down in this case, we insist that
the power "to employ an agent" carries with it the liability to
pay such an agent a reasonable compensation for his services; and
that if a married woman employs a man to work on her farm for one
day, and agrees to give him two dollars therefor, and fails so to
do, that a fair construction of the act of 1861 would allow him
to sue her before a justice of the peace, and not drive him to
the expense of filing a bill in chancery that would amount to
more than a denial of justice.

Now, if under the Act of 1861 she can employ an agent to transact
her business, we insist under the Act of 1869, giving the wife
her own earnings, and the rights to sue for the same in her own
name, free from her husband, that she has the right to be
employed as an agent, or attorney, or physician, if she is
capable, and to agree to do the duties of her profession. It
would almost seem that this question is answered by the following
extract from the opinion of this honorable court, as delivered by
Mr. Justice Lawrence, in Carpenter _vs._ Mitchell, 2 _Legal
News_, 44:

It may be said that a married woman can not adequately enjoy
her separate property unless she can make contracts in
regard to it. This is true, and hence her power to make
contracts, so far as may be necessary for the use and
enjoyment of her property, must be regarded as resulting by
implication from the statute. If she owns houses she must be
permitted to contract for their repair or rental. If she
owns a farm she must be permitted to bargain for its
cultivation, and to dispose of its products. We give these
as illustrations of the power of contracting which is fairly
implied in the law.

It is true, in this opinion the learned Judge confines his
remarks