case; "_They who pay ought
to choose whom they shall pay._" And the Lord Chief Justice
seemed to have assented to that general proposition, as
authority for the correlative proposition, that "women, when
_sole_, had a right to vote." At all events, there is here
the strongest possible evidence that in the reign of James
I., the _feme sole_, being a freeholder of a country, or
what is the same thing, of a county, of a city, or town, or
borough, where, of custom, freeholders had the right to
vote, not only had, but exercised the parliamentary
franchise. If married, she could not vote in respect merely
of her freehold, not because of the incapacities of
coverture, but for this simple reason, that, by the act of
marriage, which is an act of law, the title of the _feme
sole_ freeholder becomes vested for life in the husband. The
qualification to vote was not personal, but real;
consequently, her right to vote became suspended as soon and
for as long as she was married. I am bound to consider that
the question as to what weight is due to the dictum of my
Lord Coke is entirely disposed of by those cases from the
reign of James I. and George II., and that the authority of
the latter is unimpeached by any later authority, as the
cases of Rex. _vs._ Stubles, and Regina _vs._ Aberavon,
abundantly show.
In Anstey's Notes on the New Reform Act of 1867, the authorities
and precedents upon the right of women to vote in England are
examined and summed up, and the author concludes:
It is submitted that the weight of authority is very greatly
in favor of the female right of suffrage. Indeed, the
authority against it is contained in the short and hasty
dictum of Lord Coke, referred to above. It was set down by
him in his last and least authoritative institute, and it is
certain that he has been followed neither by the great
lawyers of his time nor by the judicature. The principles of
the law in relation to the suffrage of females will be found
in Coates _vs._ Lyle, Holt _vs._ Ingraham, and The King
_vs._ Stubles, cases decided under the strict rules for the
construction of statutes.
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