are merely specious. One is, that if the second section be
construed as admitting the right of a State to exclude certain
classes of men from the franchise, yet it could not operate as an
admission of the right to exclude women. The fallacy here is,
that if the citizenship conferred by the first section does not
secure against all legislation the right of suffrage to men, it
does not secure it to women; the question being merely as to the
meaning of the term "citizen" as used, and not as to its
application to either sex, as such. The other answer that has
been made is, that this second section is repealed by the XV.
Amendment, which forbids the denial of suffrage in the cases
where this section seems to allow it; and it is asked, with
apparent confidence, whether a law that is repealed can have any
further operation whatever. The fallacy here is, that the
operation of this second section, so far as it relates to the
present question, is wholly in throwing light upon the meaning of
the term "citizen," as used in the first section, and this
operation is just as perfect after its repeal as before;
precisely as a part of a will that has been revoked by a codicil,
may yet be read with the rest of the will if it will throw light
upon the meaning of the whole.

It is believed, however, that a valid answer can be made to the
objection which is founded upon the second section, and that the
view here presented will be ultimately sustained by the legal
opinion of the country.

1. It is not a necessary inference that the right to exclude from
suffrage is admitted by the second section, for this section will
bear a construction that is consistent with the enlarged
construction which we give to the first section; and it is a
well-settled principle that a construction that favors the
extension of liberty is itself to be favored, and one which
restricts liberty is not to be adopted, except under a necessity.
This second section provides for a penalty, in the reduction of
its basis of representation, in every case where a State should
deny to any class of citizens the right of suffrage. Now, this is
not necessarily a concession of the right, but may be regarded as
a punishment of the attempt to exercise the so-called right. The
matter was practically so