sible,
give the law a construction that will make it have a sensible
meaning and effect, and that of two constructions, one of which
gives it sense and purpose and the other none, the former is
without a question to be preferred. How much more should such a
rule be applied to an amendment of a national constitution,
deliberately adopted first by Congress and then by three-quarters
of the Legislatures of the States?

3. It is a universal rule in the construction of statutes that
the construction of an enabling or enlarging statute must be
liberal and in the direction of enlargement. This rule is
applicable with much greater force to the construction of this
amendment, because, in the first place, it is dealing with the
most fundamental of all political rights--that of _free
citizenship in a democracy_--and is besides an amendment of a
constitution, which _is itself the charter of freedom_, and the
amendment is made for the very purpose of giving _larger freedom_
than that free constitution originally gave. This rule alone is
enough to settle the question of the construction of this
amendment, especially as the question is between a construction
that shall make it an enlargement of liberty and a construction
that shall make it confer nothing that was not before possessed.

The whole question thus far has been considered with reference to
the XIV. Amendment alone. The XV. Amendment, though, as we think,
conferring no new rights, yet should be briefly noticed. That
amendment is as follows: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." Here it will be seen that the language,
in its natural meaning, implies a pre-existing _right to vote_.
It is not pertinent to the creation of a new right, but only to
the protection of a right already existing. It is like the case
occurring in some of the State constitutions, where it is
provided that the right of trial by jury shall not be denied or
impaired, in which case it has been held not to confer a new
right, but merely to protect, in its then existing form, a right
that was enjoyed when the constitution was adopted. This
construction of the XV. Amendment, however,