And, again,(1061) "In searching, directing,
teaching, divines ordinarily, and by reason of their calling, ought to go
before kings themselves; but in commanding, establishing, compelling,
kings do far excel:" where he showeth how, in defining of the
controversies of religion, in one respect ecclesiastical persons, and in
another respect kings, have the first place.

In the debating of a question of faith, kings have not, by virtue of their
princely vocation, any precedency or chief place, the action being merely
ecclesiastical. For howbeit kings may convocate a council, preside also
and govern the same as concerning the human and political order, yet,
saith Junius,(1062) _Actiones, deliberationes, et definitiones, ad
substantiam rei ecclesiasticae pertinentes, a sacerdotio sunt, a caetu
servoram Dei, quibus rei suoe administrationem mandavit Deus._ And, with
him, the Archbishop of Spalato saith, in like manner,(1063) that howbeit
Christian princes have convocated councils, and civilly governed the same,
yet they had no power nor authority in the very discussing, handling and
deciding of matters of faith.

What then? In the handling of controversies of faith, have princes no
place nor power at all beside that of political government only? Surely,
by virtue of their princely authority, they have no other place in the
handling of these matters. Yet, what if they be men of singular learning
and understanding in the Scriptures? Then let them propound their own
suffrage, with the grounds and reasons of it, even as other learned men in
the council do. But neither as princes, nor as men singularly learned, may
they require that others in the council shall dispute and debate matters,
and that they themselves shall sit as judges having judicial power of a
negative voice; for in a council no man's voice hath any greater strength
than his reasons and probation have. _Non enim admitto_, &c: "For I admit
not in a council (saith the same prelate(1064)) some as judges, others as
disputators, for I have showed that a conciliary judgment consisteth in
the approbation of that sentence which, above others, hath been showed to
have most weight, and to which no man could enough oppose. Wherefore no
man in the council ought to have a judiciary voice, unless he be withal a
disputator, and assigns a reason wherefore he assigns to that judgment and
repels another, and that reason such a one as is drawn from the Scripture
only, and from antiquity