urselves in contradictions and absurdities. But as
the perceptions of the mind are perfectly known, and I have used all
imaginable caution in forming conclusions concerning them, I have always
hoped to keep clear of those contradictions, which have attended every
other system. Accordingly the difficulty, which I have at present in
my eye, is nowise contrary to my system; but only departs a little from
that simplicity, which has been hitherto its principal force and beauty.
The passions of love and hatred are always followed by, or rather
conjoined with benevolence and anger. It is this conjunction, which
chiefly distinguishes these affections from pride and humility. For
pride and humility are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any
desire, and not immediately exciting us to action. But love and hatred
are not compleated within themselves, nor rest in that emotion, which
they produce, but carry the mind to something farther. Love is always
followed by a desire of the happiness of the person beloved, and an
aversion to his misery: As hatred produces a desire of the misery and
an aversion to the happiness of the person hated. So remarkable a
difference betwixt these two sets of passions of pride and humility,
love and hatred, which in so many other particulars correspond to each
other, merits our attention.
The conjunction of this desire and aversion with love and hatred may be
accounted for by two different hypotheses. The first is, that love and
hatred have not only a cause, which excites them, viz, pleasure and
pain; and an object, to which they are directed, viz, a person or
thinking being; but likewise an end, which they endeavour to attain,
viz, the happiness or misery of the person beloved or hated; all which
views, mixing together, make only one passion. According to this system,
love is nothing but the desire of happiness to another person, and
hatred that of misery. The desire and aversion constitute the very
nature of love and hatred. They are not only inseparable but the same.
But this is evidently contrary to experience. For though it is certain
we never love any person without desiring his happiness, nor hate any
without wishing his misery, yet these desires arise only upon the ideas
of the happiness or misery of our friend or enemy being presented by the
imagination, and are not absolutely essential to love and hatred. They
are the most obvious and natural sentiments of these affections, but not
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