ects, which they represent.

What may at first occur on this head, is, that as nothing can be
contrary to truth or reason, except what has a reference to it, and as
the judgments of our understanding only have this reference, it must
follow, that passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are
accompanyed with some judgment or opinion. According to this principle,
which is so obvious and natural, it is only in two senses, that any
affection can be called unreasonable. First, When a passion, such as
hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the
supposition or the existence of objects, which really do not exist.
Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we chuse means
insufficient for the designed end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment
of causes and effects. Where a passion is neither founded on
false suppositions, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the
understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. It is not contrary to
reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of
my finger. It is not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin,
to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown
to me. It is as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own
acknowledgeed lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent
affection for the former than the latter. A trivial good may, from
certain circumstances, produce a desire superior to what arises from
the greatest and most valuable enjoyment; nor is there any thing more
extraordinary in this, than in mechanics to see one pound weight raise
up a hundred by the advantage of its situation. In short, a passion
must be accompanyed with some false judgment in order to its being
unreasonable; and even then it is not the passion, properly speaking,
which is unreasonable, but the judgment.

The consequences are evident. Since a passion can never, in any sense,
be called unreasonable, but when founded on a false supposition or when
it chuses means insufficient for the designed end, it is impossible,
that reason and passion can ever oppose each other, or dispute for the
government of the will and actions. The moment we perceive the falshood
of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any means our passions yield
to our reason without any opposition. I may desire any fruit as of an
excellent relish; but whenever you convince me of my mistake, my longing
ceases. I may will the performance of