ther odious; but until an orator excites the
imagination, and gives force to these ideas, they may have but a feeble
influence either on the will or the affections.

But eloquence is not always necessary. The bare opinion of another,
especially when inforced with passion, will cause an idea of good or
evil to have an influence upon us, which would otherwise have been
entirely neglected. This proceeds from the principle of sympathy or
communication; and sympathy, as I have already observed, is nothing
but the conversion of an idea into an impression by the force of
imagination.

It is remarkable, that lively passions commonly attend a lively
imagination. In this respect, as well as others, the force of the
passion depends as much on the temper of the person, as the nature or
situation of the object.

I have already observed, that belief is nothing but a lively idea
related to a present impression. This vivacity is a requisite
circumstance to the exciting all our passions, the calm as well as the
violent; nor has a mere fiction of the imagination any considerable
influence upon either of them. It is too weak to take hold of the mind,
or be attended with emotion.

SECT. VII OF CONTIGUITY AND DISTANCE IN SPACE AND TIME

There is an easy reason, why every thing contiguous to us, either in
space or time, should be conceived with a peculiar force and vivacity,
and excel every other object, in its influence on the imagination.
Ourself is intimately present to us, and whatever is related to self
must partake of that quality. But where an object is so far removed
as to have lost the advantage of this relation, why, as it is farther
removed, its idea becomes still fainter and more obscure, would,
perhaps, require a more particular examination.

It is obvious, that the imagination can never totally forget the points
of space and time, in which we are existent; but receives such frequent
advertisements of them from the passions and senses, that however it
may turn its attention to foreign and remote objects, it is necessitated
every moment to reflect on the present. IOt is also remarkable, that in
the conception of those objects, which we regard as real and existent,
we take them in their proper order and situation, and never leap from
one object to another, which is distant from it, without running over,
at least in a cursory manner, all those objects, which are interposed
betwixt them. When we reflect, therefore, on