er, which they bestow, of
enjoying all the pleasures of life; and as this is their very nature and
essence, it must be the first source of all the passions, which arise
from them. One of the most considerable of these passions is that of
love or esteem in others, which therefore proceeds from a sympathy with
the pleasure of the possessor. But the possessor has also a secondary
satisfaction in riches arising from the love and esteem he acquires by
them, and this satisfaction is nothing but a second reflexion of
that original pleasure, which proceeded from himself. This secondary
satisfaction or vanity becomes one of the principal recommendations
of riches, and is the chief reason, why we either desire them for
ourselves, or esteem them in others. Here then is a third rebound of the
original pleasure; after which it is difficult to distinguish the images
and reflexions, by reason of their faintness and confusion.

SECT. VI OF BENEVOLENCE AND ANGER

Ideas may be compared to the extension and solidity of matter, and
impressions, especially reflective ones, to colours, tastes, smells and
other sensible qualities. Ideas never admit of a total union, but are
endowed with a kind of impenetrability, by which they exclude each
other, and are capable of forming a compound by their conjunction,
not by their mixture. On the other hand, impressions and passions are
susceptible of an entire union; and like colours, may be blended so
perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute
only to vary that uniform impression, which arises from the whole. Some
of the most curious phaenomena of the human mind are derived from this
property of the passions.

In examining those ingredients, which are capable of uniting with love
and hatred, I begin to be sensible, in some measure, of a misfortune,
that has attended every system of philosophy, with which the world has
been yet acquainted. It is commonly found, that in accounting for the
operations of nature by any particular hypothesis; among a number
of experiments, that quadrate exactly with the principles we would
endeavour to establish; there is always some phaenomenon, which is more
stubborn, and will not so easily bend to our purpose. We need not be
surprized, that this should happen in natural philosophy. The essence
and composition of external bodies are so obscure, that we must
necessarily, in our reasonings, or rather conjectures concerning
them, involve o