ion in the imagination, that it passes from
one to the other, without any doubt or hesitation. But below this there
are many inferior degrees of evidence and probability, nor does one
single contrariety of experiment entirely destroy all our reasoning. The
mind ballances the contrary experiments, and deducting the inferior from
the superior, proceeds with that degree of assurance or evidence, which
remains. Even when these contrary experiments are entirely equal, we
remove not the notion of causes and necessity; but supposing that the
usual contrariety proceeds from the operation of contrary and concealed
causes, we conclude, that the chance or indifference lies only in
our judgment on account of our imperfect knowledge, not in the things
themselves, which are in every case equally necessary, though to
appearance not equally constant or certain. No union can be more
constant and certain, than that of some actions with some motives and
characters; and if in other cases the union is uncertain, it is no more
than what happens in the operations of body, nor can we conclude any
thing from the one irregularity, which will not follow equally from the
other.
It is commonly allowed that mad-men have no liberty. But were we to
judge by their actions, these have less regularity and constancy than
the actions of wise-men, and consequently are farther removed from
necessity. Our way of thinking in this particular is, therefore,
absolutely inconsistent; but is a natural consequence of these confused
ideas and undefined terms, which we so commonly make use of in our
reasonings, especially on the present subject.
We must now shew, that as the union betwixt motives and actions has the
same constancy, as that in any natural operations, so its influence
on the understanding is also the same, in determining us to infer the
existence of one from that of another. If this shall appear, there is no
known circumstance, that enters into the connexion and production of the
actions of matter, that is not to be found in all the operations of
the mind; and consequently we cannot, without a manifest absurdity,
attribute necessity to the one, and refuse into the other.
There is no philosopher, whose judgment is so riveted to this
fantastical system of liberty, as not to acknowledge the force of moral
evidence, and both in speculation and practice proceed upon it, as upon
a reasonable foundation. Now moral evidence is nothing but a conclusion
con
|