all object has preceded; nor does even the imagination alter the
dimensions of its object on account of a comparison with others. The
question then is, how from the same impression and the same idea we can
form such different judgments concerning the same object, and at one
time admire its bulk, and at another despise its littleness. This
variation in our judgments must certainly proceed from a variation
in some perception; but as the variation lies not in the immediate
impression or idea of the object, it must lie in some other impression,
that accompanies it.

In order to explain this matter, I shall just touch upon two principles,
one of which shall be more fully explained in the progress of this
treatise; the other has been already accounted for. I believe it may
safely be established for a general maxim, that no object is presented
to the senses, nor image formed in the fancy, but what is accompanyed
with some emotion or movement of spirits proportioned to it; and however
custom may make us insensible of this sensation and cause us to confound
it with the object or idea, it will be easy, by careful and exact
experiments, to separate and distinguish them. For to instance only in
the cases of extension and number; it is evident, that any very bulky
object, such as the ocean, an extended plain, a vast chain of mountains,
a wide forest: or any very numerous collection of objects, such as an
army, a fleet, a crowd, excite in the mind a sensible emotion; and that
the admiration, which arises on the appearance of such objects, is one
of the most lively pleasures, which human nature is capable of enjoying.
Now as this admiration encreases or diminishes by the encrease or
diminution of the objects, we may conclude, according to our foregoing
[Book I. Part III. Sect. 15.] principles, that it is a compound effect,
proceeding from the conjunction of the several effects, which arise from
each part of the cause. Every part, then, of extension, and every unite
of number has a separate emotion attending it; and though that emotion
be not always agreeable, yet by its conjunction with others, and by its
agitating the spirits to a just pitch, it contributes to the production
of admiration, which is always agreeable. If this be allowed with
respect to extension and number, we can make no difficulty with respect
to virtue and vice, wit and folly, riches and poverty, happiness and
misery, and other objects of that kind, which are always