xion
betwixt us; in the same manner as I love a brother or countryman. A
rival has almost as close a relation to me as a partner. For as the
pleasure of the latter causes my pleasure, and his pain my pain; so the
pleasure of the former causes my pain, and his pain my pleasure. The
connexion, then, of cause and effect is the same in both cases; and
if in the one case, the cause and effect have a farther relation of
resemblance, they have that of contrariety in the other; which, being
also a species of resemblance, leaves the matter pretty equal.
The only explication, then, we can give of this phaenomenon is derived
from that principle of a parallel direction above-mentioned. Our concern
for our own interest gives us a pleasure in the pleasure, and a pain in
the pain of a partner, after the same manner as by sympathy we feel a
sensation correspondent to those, which appear in any person, who is
present with us. On the other hand, the same concern for our interest
makes us feel a pain in the pleasure, and a pleasure in the pain of a
rival; and in short the same contrariety of sentiments as arises from
comparison and malice. Since, therefore, a parallel direction of the
affections, proceeding from interest, can give rise to benevolence or
anger, no wonder the same parallel direction, derived from sympathy and
from comparison, should have the same effect.
In general we may observe, that it is impossible to do good to others,
from whatever motive, without feeling some touches of kindness and
good-will towards them; as the injuries we do, not only cause hatred in
the person, who suffers them, but even in ourselves. These phaenomena,
indeed, may in part be accounted for from other principles.
But here there occurs a considerable objection, which it will be
necessary to examine before we proceed any farther. I have endeavoured
to prove, that power and riches, or poverty and meanness; which give
rise to love or hatred, without producing any original pleasure or
uneasiness; operate upon us by means of a secondary sensation derived
from a sympathy with that pain or satisfaction, which they produce in
the person, who possesses them. From a sympathy with his pleasure there
arises love; from that with his uneasiness, hatred. But it is a maxim,
which I have just now established, and which is absolutely necessary to
the explication of the phaenomena of pity and malice, that it is not the
present sensation or momentary pain or pleas
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