rocess
as a court of law, Darnall, if he thought proper, would have been at
liberty to proceed on his judgment, and compel the payment of the money,
although the allegations in the bill were true, and he was incapable of
making a title. No other court could have enjoined him, for certainly no
State equity court could interfere in that way with the judgment of a
Circuit Court of the United States.

But the Circuit Court as a court of equity certainly had equity
jurisdiction over its own judgment as a court of law, without regard to
the character of the parties; and had not only the right, but it was its
duty--no matter who were the parties in the judgment--to prevent them
from proceeding to enforce it by execution, if the court was satisfied
that the money was not justly and equitably due. The ability of Darnall
to convey did not depend upon his citizenship, but upon his title to
freedon. And if he was free, he could hold and convey property, by the
laws of Maryland, although he was not a citizen. But if he was by law
still a slave, he could not. It was therefore the duty of the court,
sitting as a court of equity in the latter case, to prevent him from
using its process, as a court of common law, to compel the payment of
the purchase-money, when it was evident that the purchaser must lose the
land. But if he was free and could make a title, it was equally the duty
of the court not to suffer Legrand to keep the land, and refuse the
payment of the money, upon the ground that Darnall was incapable of
suing or being sued as a citizen in a court of the United States. The
character or citizenship of the parties had no connection with the
question of jurisdiction, and the matter in dispute had no relation to
the citizenship of Darnall. Nor is such a question alluded to in the
opinion of the Court.

Beside, we are by no means prepared to say that there are not many
cases, civil as well as criminal, in which a Circuit Court of the United
States may exercise jurisdiction, although one of the African race is a
party; that broad question is not before the court. The question with
which we are now dealing is, whether a person of the African race can be
a citizen of the United States, and become thereby entitled to a special
privilege, by virtue of his title to that character, and which, under
the Constitution, no one but a citizen can claim. It is manifest that
the case of Legrand and Darnall has no bearing on that question, and ca