uld be better satisfied as to Darnell's right to convey. Darnall, in
the mean time, had taken up his residence in Pennsylvania, and brought
suit on the notes, and recovered judgment in the Circuit Court for the
district of Maryland.

The whole proceeding, as appears by the report, was an amicable one;
Legrand being perfectly willing to pay the money, if he could obtain a
title, and Darnall not wishing him to pay unless he could make him a
good one. In point of fact, the whole proceeding was under the direction
of the counsel who argued the case for the appellee, who was the mutual
friend of the parties, and confided in by both of them, and whose only
object was to have the rights of both parties established by judicial
decision in the most speedy and least expensive manner.

Legrand, therefore, raised no objection to the jurisdiction of the court
in the suit at law, because he was himself anxious to obtain the
judgment of the court upon his title. Consequently, there was nothing in
the record before the court to show that Darnall was of African descent,
and the usual judgment and award of execution was entered. And Legrand
thereupon filed his bill on the equity side of the Circuit Court,
stating that Darnall was born a slave, and had not been legally
emancipated, and could not therefore take the land devised to him, nor
make Legrand a good title; and praying an injunction to restrain Darnall
from proceeding to execution on the judgment, which was granted.
Darnall answered, averring in his answer that he was a free man, and
capable of conveying a good title. Testimony was taken on this point,
and at the hearing the Circuit Court was of opinion that Darnall was a
free man and his title good, and dissolved the injunction and dismissed
the bill; and that decree was affirmed here, upon the appeal of Legrand.

Now, it is difficult to imagine how any question about the citizenship
of Darnall, or his right to sue in that character, can be supposed to
have risen or been decided in that case. The fact that he was of African
descent was first brought before the court upon the bill in equity. The
suit at law had then passed into judgment and award of execution, and
the Circuit Court, as a court of law, had no longer any authority over
it. It was a valid and legal judgment, which the court that rendered it
had not the power to reverse or set aside. And unless it had
jurisdiction as a court of equity to restrain him from using its p