to defeat Hood. On paper Thomas had
plenty of men, but Sherman had taken his pick of infantry, cavalry,
artillery and transportation, leaving the odds and ends with Thomas,
consisting largely of post troops garrisoning towns; bridge guards in
block-houses along the railroads; new regiments recruited by the payment
of the big bounties that produced the infamous tribe of bounty jumpers;
negro regiments never yet tested in battle; green drafted men assigned
to some of the old, depleted regiments in such large numbers as to
change their veteran character; dismounted cavalrymen sent back to get
horses, and convalescents and furloughed men belonging to the army with
Sherman who had come up too late to join their commands, organized into
temporary companies and regiments.
Moreover, Thomas' forces were scattered from East Tennessee to Central
Missouri, where General A.J. Smith, with two divisions of the
Sixteenth corps, was marching for St. Louis to take steamboats to join
Thomas at Nashville. The only force available for immediate field
service consisted of the Fourth and the Twenty-third corps, the two
weakest corps of Sherman's army, which he had sent back to Thomas. These
two corps, temporarily commanded by General Schofield, were thrown well
forward towards Florence to delay Hood long enough for Thomas to
concentrate and organize from his widely scattered resources a force
strong enough to give battle to Hood.
Passing over all prior operations we will take up the situation as it
was the morning of November 29th. General Schofield had then well in
hand on the north bank of Duck River, opposite Columbia, Tennessee, the
divisions of Kimball, Wagner and Wood, composing the Fourth corps, and
of Cox and Ruger, of the Twenty-third corps, Ruger's lacking one brigade
on detached service. Across the river were two divisions of General S.
D. Lee's corps of Hood's Army. The preceding evening Hood, himself, with
the corps of Cheatham and Stewart, and Johnson's division of Lee's
corps, had moved up the river five and one-half miles to Davis' ford,
where he was laying his pontoons preparatory to crossing. His plan was
to detain Schofield at the river by feinting with two divisions while he
would lead seven divisions past the left flank and plant them across
Schofield's line of retreat at Spring Hill, twelve miles north of Duck
River. As Hood greatly outnumbered Schofield, his plan contemplated the
destruction of Schofield's army.
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